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ABSTRACT
Due to the scarcity of transplantable organs, patients must typically wait on long lists for
many years to get a matching kidney. This scarcity has created an illicit marketplace for
wealthy recipients to avoid long waiting times. Brokers arrange such organ transplants and
collect most of the payment that is sometimes channeled to fund other illicit activities. In
order to collect and disburse payments, they often resort to money laundering-like schemes
of money transfers. As the low-cost Internet arrives in some of the affected countries, social
media and the dark web are used to illegally trade human organs. This paper presents a
model to assess the risk of human organ trafficking in specific areas and shows methods and
tools to discover digital traces of organ trafficking using publicly available tools.
Keywords: Clandestine Organ Transplants, Organ Trafficking, Probabilistic Risk Model,
Dark Web Crawling
1. INTRODUCTION
Due to the lack of transplantable organs, pa-
tients must wait on transplant lists for many
years (sometimes six years for kidney trans-
plants) and some die during the waiting peri-
ods of their transplants. In order to avoid this
long wait, wealthy patients buy organs from
poor people in countries that legally or ille-
gally enable such transplants. Some hospitals
and clinics do not enforce legal restrictions on
such transplants, thereby facilitating a clan-
destine marketplace for illicit organ trade.
Based on the findings from analyzing the
collected organ trafficking data, the prices
for kidneys have been more than doubled
between 2008 and 2015, and prices for liv-
ers have also increased by the same absolute
amount as kidneys. These higher profits at-
tract more illegal organ trafficking around the
world. However, interviewees of one study
stated that although buyers pay more, sell-
ers get far less for their organs. In addition,
some recipients tend to become brokers at
a later stage. Many researchers investigated
clandestine organ trades have discovered that
health conditions of sellers deteriorate after
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clandestine sales and are subjected to social
stigma so that they eventually regret their
sale in 94% of the cases (Mijovic-Das, 2011).
According to Fraser (2016), the numbers of
kidneys sold on social media have increased
since 2010. One reason for this development
is the“[...] uptake of low-cost internet access
in source countries of trafficked individuals.”
There is a clear shift from buyers dealing with
online rather than in-person brokers, that is
in keeping with global trends, and addition-
ally provides a layer of protection from law
enforcement for brokers. Furthermore, direct
contact using social media is beneficial for or-
gan sellers and buyers because they can avoid
high brokerage costs. Although kidneys are
still sold in specific social media groups since
2015, administrators have started to block
organ trade conducted on their social media
platforms. Furthermore, due to the increas-
ing awareness of the digital footprint left by
sellers and buyers, more middlemen use hid-
den services in the dark web to arrange such
illegal trading of human organs, as well as
resort to using money laundering schemes
to collect and disburse the majority of the
payments.
The objective of our effort is to predict
the evolution of organ trading networks, so
that we can suggest some deterrent mecha-
nisms for spreading clandestine organ trans-
plants. One such deterrent mechanism pro-
posed during a survey was to have a system
to anonymously report patients during pre-
transplant and post-transplant stages using
an established system, as more drastic actions
would be counterproductive to the treatment
and well-being of recipient patients. In or-
der to achieve our objective, we use some
known data collected by translating hand-
written notes produced by on-site investiga-
tors, in addition to mining dark web forums
and marketplaces to create an organ trading
risk model.
2. RELATED WORK
Human trafficking, sometimes referred to as
modern slavery (Koettl, 2009) in the 21st
century, continues to be a challenge to the
international community. Many researchers
and organizations concentrate their efforts to
reduce human trafficking around the world.
Mo introduced an aspiration-based model
of human trafficking vulnerability in (Mo,
2018). The author expounded that an in-
creased salience in relative deprivation can
lead individuals to seek more risks, thereby
subjecting themselves and their children at
greater risk of being exploited. Furthermore,
Aronowitz, Theuermann, and Tyurykanova
(2010) investigated criminal gangs and their
modus operandi using evidence-based re-
search. They show that other factors, such
as economic and social forces can also in-
crease potential victims’ vulnerability. Con-
sequently, the more knowledge of involved
factors in the human trafficking chain are
available the better predictions can be pro-
duced and accurate warnings for early inter-
ventions provided.
About 0.3% of reported human traffick-
ing cases involve organ trafficking, and per-
sons trafficked for organ removal have been
detected in 16 countries in all regions of
the world according to the Global Report
on Trafficking in Persons (United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014). Some
tools have been developed to support the
combat against organ trafficking. For exam-
ple, the Coalition for Organ Failure Solutions
(COFS)1 developed the online reporting tool
XDOT (eXpose and Disrupt Organ Traffick-
ing), to collect and analyze case reports and
examine linkages and patterns around the
activities of human trafficking for organ re-
moval. Although “an ounce of prevention is
worth a pound of cure”, the comprehensive
1http://cofs.org/home/
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studies in organ trafficking are far behind as
mentioned in (Aronowitz et al., 2010). We
take such a challenge by developing a risk
model of organ trafficking which associates
with the amount of estimated damage. This
risk model is meant to model real-world ac-
tions of organ trafficking in order to identify
the potential organ traffickers which will help
to intervene or even prevent the organ traf-
ficking.
3. UNDERSTANDING
ORGAN TRAFFICKING
To get an understanding of the complex pro-
cess and impact of diverse attributes on hu-
man organ trafficking, this section summa-
rizes existing research (Fraser, 2016; United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014,
2015; Ambagtsheer & Weimar, 2016; Gerken
& Wagner, 2016; Yousaf & Purkayastha,
2016) and knowledge gathered during inter-
views with subject-matter experts. Due to
its nature, human organ trafficking involves
many logistics. However, a large part of this
paper deals with the steps performed and the
traces left in the digital world. Nevertheless,
focusing on these traces and following the re-
sulting electronic communication chains can
provide indications that may support and
lead to real-world investigations.
3.1 Actors
Many people with diverse backgrounds are
involved in human organ trafficking. Figure 1
visualizes the relationships between four main
roles in organ trafficking. The following para-
graphs furthermore characterize them as well
as their motivations:
• Buyers: Buyers of human organs are
most likely patients from richer countries
suffering from diseases such as renal in-
sufficiency. Due to the limited storage
Figure 1. Main actors in the organ trafficking
process and their relationships.
and transportation capability, it is un-
likely that organs are physically bought
with the intention to resell them after
removal. Rather, buyers and sellers/-
donors are brought to the same location
by brokers and the transplant is done
by surgeons who also financially benefit
from the procedure.
• Sellers/Donors: Sellers of organs are
often poor, young males. While some
sellers proactively search for opportuni-
ties to sell their organs to make money
(either autonomously or motivated by
their socioeconomic environment), oth-
ers are attracted by advertisements offer-
ing money without clearly stating that
the actual return is an organ removal.
Another constantly increasing group are
young refugees who are paying their own
trafficking costs with organs.
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• Brokers: Brokers are the central actors
holding together the whole organ traffick-
ing network. They are also the group fi-
nancially benefiting the most. While sell-
ers get a four to a low five-digit amount
in US dollars, the buyers often pay a
six-digit amount in US dollars for an
organ.
• Transplant Surgeons/Hospitals: Al-
though breaking legal and ethical stan-
dards, there are medical professionals
that willingly transplant trafficked or-
gans benefiting from the high prices
payed for organs.
Additionally, several other actors may po-
tentially participate in actions facilitating
the organ trafficking process, such as arrang-
ing fake visas and passports, laundering the
money paid for the trafficked organ, or pro-
viding covered or pre-textual transportation.
Involvement of those groups varies from case
to case. Due to their economic situation and
the lack of awareness on the risks associated
with trafficking and transplantation, sellers
are regularly the most vulnerable party in the
illegal organ trade system. Hence, the inves-
tigations’ main focus should be on protecting
these individuals.
3.2 Activities involved in the
Organ Trafficking Process
Brokers play a significant role in organ traf-
ficking. Sellers and buyers typically never
communicate or meet in-person before the
actual transplantation begins. Even at the
time of the transplantation, they are usually
not introduced. Rather, usually their single
point of contact is the broker. Sometimes
former buyers become brokers in order to get
back the oftentimes high debts incurred in
getting their own transplants. Surgeons that
have already been involved in the transplant-
ing of trafficked organs refer new patients to
old ones in order to reach out to their for-
mer sources/brokers. Hence, some surgeons
themselves also act as brokers.
The process described so far depends on
already established social relations between
brokers, surgeons, and their current as well
as former patients. Communication between
these groups is usually private and not pub-
licly analyzable. However, there are also ex-
emplary scenarios in which actors have to
communicate their desires to a broader audi-
ence:
• An ill patient desperately searching for
a specific organ and has not established
any connections to any person who is
already involved in organ trafficking.
• A broker who has a potential buyer but
has no available a seller yet.
Because organ trafficking cannot be openly
advertised in the surface web, all groups of
actors use more private channels of commu-
nication, bringing social media (deep web)
and the dark web into play. In this case, the
process can be generalized (approximately)
as follows:
1. First contact using social media groups
or dark web forums/markets.
2. Switching to another, more private chan-
nel which is usually using mobile mes-
sengers or email.
3. Negotiate terms and conditions.
4. Trafficking the donor to a safe house
which is close to the surgical theater.
5. Prepare the donor and the recipient for
the transplant.
6. Carry out the transplant.
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Apparently, the presented process of or-
gan trafficking is very dynamic. It cannot be
directly applied to the data obtained from
the dark or deep web. Usually, only the first
step and its transition to the second step
can be obtained without extended legal and
operational capabilities. Hence, we focus on
detecting clandestine indicators which can be
used to enrich a risk model and to contin-
gently start further investigations. To do so,
we first extensively search the dark web for
specific initial keywords using the methodol-
ogy and tools described shortly. Then, we
use the indicators found to derive additional
keywords and focus on the most suspicious
hidden services.
4. REAL-WORLD
DATA COLLECTION
We received the organ trafficking data, in
the form of summarized interviews from one
of our collaborators. There are about 500
records that include basic information, such
as operational location, nationalities, gender,
and/or age of buyers and sellers, etc. Based
on the collected data, we can understand the
factors which may induce organ trafficking.
Answers of donors who stated to believe
that they were smuggled into the hospital
and specifically told to lie about the proce-
dure of the transplantation are just one ex-
ample of data we used in this study. Analyz-
ing the years in which these statements were
recorded, we found out that prior to 2011,
transplantation procedures were more openly
conducted and have become more clandes-
tine after that year because law enforcement
started to focus more on this issue. Hence,
there was little need to smuggle buyers into
the hospital prior to 2011. However, the data
shows a shift from 2011 onward of buyers be-
ing smuggled into hospitals. There is clearly
a progressive effort by surgeons and hospitals
to avoid detection by authorities. Therefore,
political factors should be involved in creat-
ing a risk model for organ trafficking, as we
did in this project.
During our research, we studied the Fragile
States Index (FSI) (Fund For Peace, 2017)
to quantify some aspects of political and so-
cial turmoil that may enhance organ traffick-
ing risks. We found out that many factors
are common between our risk model for or-
gan trafficking and FSI. We also observed
better views of relationships among the fac-
tors by analyzing the FSI. For example, in
the questionnaire, the payment flow can be
one of three categories: (1) cash payment
to brokers or cash payments to surgeon, (2)
bank account transfers, and (3) using online
funds transfer company. We learned from
the responses collected during interviews car-
ried out in Egypt that kidney buyers in this
country typically use multiple payment meth-
ods and those payment patterns for kidneys
traded in Egypt have changed considerably
since 2008. Importantly, there will likely
be multiple payments made in each cate-
gory. The idea of this appears to be ensuring
that no single traceable transaction exceeds
$10,000. Similar strategies are used in money
laundering so that the involved banks do not
necessarily trigger a report to the authorities.
More importantly, the changes in payment
methods from 2008–2016 indicate the current
relationships among payments, brokers, and
surgeons as we will discuss next.
Up until 2011, in Egypt, the surgeons were
at the top of the trafficking hierarchy. The
surgeons arranged the kidney donor/seller
pairs, and received all payments directly
from the sellers or their appointed brokers.
The brokers were agents for or employees
of the surgeon. From 2012 onward, kidney
donors/sellers have been primarily sourced
from Syria. Previous payments were made
directly to Egypt whereas they afterwards
have been directed to third countries instead.
The brokers are now in charge of the traffick-
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ing operations and the surgeons who perform
the transplants are now employees of the bro-
kers. Buyers from the USA, Japan, Turkey,
and Germany often meet a broker in their
home country before traveling to Egypt and
payments are made to this broker. These
brokers in the buyer’s home country claim
to be previous buyers of a kidney. They
convey a sense of security and genuine sales.
They check that the client is a bonafide buyer
(not media, researchers or law enforcement),
provide details of the transplant procedure
and attempt to close the deal with the client.
Such relationships should be taken into ac-
count during the development of our organ
trafficking risk model.
5. DARK WEB DATA
COLLECTION
There are three terms regularly used to cat-
egorize websites. The first category of web-
sites is the so-called surface web, the well-
known part of the web which is crawled and
indexed by search engines. The second cat-
egory of websites is the so-called deep web,
websites and other information repositories
such as databases which are protected by lo-
gins and not indexed by search engines and
therefore harder to find. Apart from that,
the technology to host and publish the deep
web does not differentiate from the usual
surface web. Once located and registered,
its content can be reached by using normal
web browsers. Furthermore, both owners
of clients and servers are not more or less
anonymous than in the surface web (Chertoff
& Simon, 2015). The third category of web-
sites is the so-called dark web, where the
content is provided by web servers that are
only accessible within dark nets. Similar to
the deep web, information in the dark web
is also not indexed by regular search engines
like Google. Dark nets are a part of the In-
ternet that can only be reached by making
use of special overlay networks. Although
there are also other approaches such as The
Invisible Internet Project (I2P)2, this paper
has its focus on The Onion Router (TOR)3
because it is the most frequented dark net.
Services, such as websites, which are reach-
able within the borders of the The Onion
Router (TOR) network have to use the Hid-
den Service Protocol (The TOR Project,
2017b) and are therefore referred to as hid-
den services. They are addressed by a
16-character long unique identifier and the
.onion pseudo top level domain suffix. The
identifier consists of the first 80 bits of the
RSA public key’s SHA-1 digest encoded in
base32 (The TOR Project, 2017a; Bezem
& Solberg, 2013). It is usually referred
to as the .onion name. One of the most
well known examples of an .onion name
is facebookcorewwwi.onion, addressing an
instance of Facebook’s website hosted as a
hidden service in the TOR network. In or-
der to access it, users have to make use of
the TOR browser4 which is a modified ver-
sion of Mozilla Firefox. Employing the TOR
browser, the .onion name can be used just
like a regular URL in the TOR browser’s
address bar. TOR enables both users (via
the TOR browser) and content providers (via
TOR hidden services) to act anonymously.
Hence, TOR is used by whistle-blowers
and politically oppressed oppositions of auto-
cratic and dictatorial states. However, there
is also a growing number of people abusing
the provided anonymity for clandestine activ-
ities. In addition to drug (Buxton & Bing-
ham, 2015) and arms trade (Weimann, 2016),
human trafficking (National Association of
State Mental Health, 2016) is a major clan-
destine activity that has benefited from dark
nets. Due to financial structures of clandes-
2https://geti2p.net/en/
3https://www.torproject.org/
4https://www.torproject.org/projects/
torbrowser.html.en
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tine organizations, just as human trafficking,
illegal human organ trafficking does not only
harm people who are directly affected (with
or without their consent) but also threatens
public safety in general (Weimann, 2016).
Because of the lack of major commer-
cial search engines focusing on hidden
services, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) initiated the
Memex project (Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, 2014) providing a collec-
tion of tools5 to enable researchers, govern-
ment agencies and non-governmental orga-
nizations to search and analyze information
in the dark web. Some of the customized
tools are already established and help law
enforcement agencies to successfully fight hu-
man trafficking (Prosecutors’ Center for Ex-
cellence, 2016). However, due to differentiat-
ing characteristics, tools developed to inves-
tigate human trafficking cannot be deployed
one-to-one to investigate human organ traf-
ficking.
Although more advertising and communi-
cation for illegal organ trades move from the
deep to the dark web, there are still relevant
social media groups pretending to be sup-
portive sites for people affected by illnesses
(for example dependent on dialysis). How-
ever, in the anonymous comments made on
these pages, brokers often offer help in the
form of organs. Once the initial contact is
established, further communication is lead in
the dark web to ensure anonymity.
We focused on activities undertaken in
dark web platforms/hidden services that are
heavily decentralized and anonymous. While
manually searching the dark web for content
related to organ trade (especially of kidneys),
we found that this kind of advertisements
are posted in regular forums and newsgroups
rather than on the popular marketplaces that
5https://opencatalog.darpa.mil/MEMEX
.html
are used for other illegal activities such as
drug and weapon trades. We also present
methods to adapt tools of the Memex pro-
gram to reveal clandestine organ trade in the
dark web.
In addition to the standard TOR browser
which is used to manually enter, browse,
and investigate the dark web, a mix of
self-developed tools as well as tools from
DARPA’s Memex program are used. In the
following sections, we describe these tools
and their usage through chosen examples.
Figure 2. Methodology of dark web mining.
5.1 Hidden Services Discovery
Before the content of the dark web can be
processed in order to find patterns of ille-
gal human organ trafficking, the first chal-
lenge is to discover the actual hidden services.
Because they are not indexed like the well-
known surface web, other ways to access the
provided data have to be developed. Hence,
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Figure 3. The tasks and interaction of tools
in the process of hidden service discovery.
as shown in Figure 3, we propose to collect
as many .onion addresses of hidden services
as possible, test the reachability of these hid-
den services and finally crawl them in order
to reveal their structure. Once the needed
data is available, processing of the content
can begin.
5.2 Harvesting
Considering base32’s (Josefsson, 2006) al-
phanumeric character set (characters A–Z
and digits 2–7: n=32) and the length of 16
symbols per .onion URL (k=16) (The TOR
Project, 2017a), there are nk = 3216 ≈
1.2 ·1024 .onion names addressing potentially
available hidden services. Even quite opti-
mistically assuming that 500 hidden services
can be probed per second, it is still impossible
to test all variations due to the high num-
ber of possible combinations, TOR’s cryp-
tographic and network overhead, and conse-
quential network latency. A large range of
possible ports other than the default HTTP
port 80, such as the default HTTPS port 443
and the also commonly used port range of
port 8000 to port 9000 are not even consid-
ered in this calculation. Thus, it is necessary
to consider approaches other than brute force
(trying all possibilities).
The most thorough method is to set up
a large amount of TOR relays with specific
fingerprints for a minimum of 25 hours in or-
der to get the HSDir flag assigned. Properly
configured, this would allow one to observe
the deployment of hidden service descriptors
which could be used to calculate .onion ad-
dresses (Biryukov et al., 2013). However, this
way is very time and resource consuming.
Hence, in order to get a reasonably long
list of hidden services representing a starting
point for crawling more quickly, we created
a Python script named OnionHarvester 6 to
parse .onion names from publicly available
websites such as hidden wikis. The tool uses
a manually compiled list of websites, Google
search results, or a combination of both. The
corresponding parameters can be passed as
values prefixed by the command line argu-
ments -i (list of websites) and -s (Google
search terms). Furthermore, an output file
can be defined using the argument -o. The
command below shows how to let OnionHar-
vester parse the websites listed in the file
list.txt and additionally parse the content
of the websites listed as results of the Google
search for the term hidden wiki. The parsed
.onion names are then written into the file
harvest.txt.
$ . / on i on ha rve s t e r . py − i l i s t .
txt −s ” hidden wik i ” −o
harves t . txt
5.3 Probing
Once the list is generated, the actual prob-
ing of the corresponding services can begin.
An exemplary command handing over the for-
merly generated list containing hidden service
identifiers to HSProbe7 and defining some pa-
rameter reads as follows:
6https://github.com/mheinl/onion\
harvester.py
7http://public.mtc.sri.com/MEMEX/
hsprobe-2.1.tar.gz
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$ . / hsprobe . py −−input− f i l e
harves t . txt −−o u t p u t f i l e
probing . l og −−download−d i r
r e s u l t s −−probe−spec
80 ,443 ,8080−8088: http , https
HSProbe creates a logfile (blurred example
shown in Figure 4) listing the hidden service’s
unique identifier, the tested port, the Unix
timestamp, the hidden service’s status, and
-if the probe was successful- the used protocol.
Additionally, for every successfully answered
probe request HSProbe creates a file named
after the following scheme:
<onionURL> <portNumber> <protoco l>
These files contain the whole response in-
cluding HTTP message header and body.
Hence, their content could technically already
be used to make a pre-selection based on spe-
cific characteristics such as keywords. How-
ever, virtually none of the websites / forums
involved in illegal organ trade indicate their
actual content already on the landing page.
Consequently, any successfully probed hidden
service is going to be considered potentially
interesting.
Figure 4. Extract of HSProbe logfile.
5.4 Crawling
Knowing which of the harvested .onion
names do actually address active hidden
services, they can be crawled using Onion-
Crawler 8 which is similar to the Memex tool
Hidden Service Forum Spider 9 developed by
8https://github.com/mheinl/OnionCrawler
9http://public.mtc.sri.com/MEMEX/
forumSpider.tar.gz
SRI International. Both tools are based on
the Python-based scraping and web crawling
framework Scrapy10.
OnionCrawler provides two pipelines. One
pipeline allows storing scraped websites into
a file and directory-based structure within
a specific folder. The other one stores the
scraped websites into a previously set up
PostgreSQL database. The default creden-
tials specified in settings.py can either be
changed in order to adapt to a already ex-
isting database or a new database using this
default credentials can be set up.
To be able to crawl the TOR network,
OnionCrawler has to be run over the TOR
SOCKS proxy. This can be easily achieved by
calling Scrapy with the preceding torsocks
command: $ torsocks scrapy crawl
OnionCrawler. However, when using the
pipeline to write scraped websites into a Post-
greSQL database, torsocks throws an error
because it does not allow to connect to local
resources by default. In order to fix that, the
parameter AllowOutboundLocalhost
1 in the torsocks config file
(/etc/tor/torsocks.conf in the case
of Linux) has to be uncommented.
Although it is usually not advisable for
ethically working, commercial web indexing
bots, the user agent has to be changed in
order to avoid the hidden services’ operators
from evading. Thus, instead of a Scrapy spi-
der, the configured user agent pretends to
be a usual TOR browser in the most recent
version available. Not obeying the hidden ser-
vices’ robots.txt allows one to explore also
sites which are not intended to be discovered
by crawlers. In addition to the above men-
tioned ways of customizing OnionCrawler’s
behaviour, it can also be controlled using com-
mand line arguments described in its readme
file.
10https://scrapy.org/
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Figure 5. Advertisement posted by a potential seller in the dark web forum Moneybook.
Figure 6. Advertisement posted by a potential buyer in the dark web forum Moneybook.
After mining the dark web using the afore-
mentioned methods, we were able to obtain
data related to organ trafficking, as shown
in Figure 5 and Figure 6. Commonly pro-
vided information about the donor is gender,
age, and blood group as well as the reasons
for selling an organ. Those findings will also
be used to develop our organ trafficking risk
model.
6. A RISK MODEL OF
ORGAN TRAFFICKING
Preliminary models of evolving real-world
phenomena are always incomplete and in-
consistent, and not different in the case of
organ trafficking chains. However, the pre-
sentation of factors and their relationships
causes people and organizations to get in-
volved. Therefore, our risk model will be de-
veloped to be able to cope with the effects of
uncertain phenomena. In other words, we de-
veloped a probabilistic knowledge-based risk
model that is able to account for inherent
uncertainties on evolving hypotheses. Our
development process as follows:
• Creating a collection of factors / nodes
from literature studies and gained data:
In earlier sections, we illustrated how we
collected data both manually and auto-
matically, and provided some examples
of how we are making nodes by the anal-
ysis of the data.
• Retrieving the relationships: We ex-
tracted the relationships from our
learned knowledge of organ trafficking
by representing it in the form of nodes.
We identified actors at each stage of or-
gan trafficking and the possible money
flow among them.
• Selecting modeling tools to design the
model: We chose the open-source Java
application UnBBayes11 which is able
to build probabilistic models based on
Bayesian probability and performing
11http://unbbayes.sourceforge.net/
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plausible reasoning. Both a GUI (Graph-
ical User Interface) as well as an API
(Application Programming Interface) are
available.
• Generating the risk model: Adding
states for each node as shown in Fig-
ure 7.
Some basic characteristics of the model
according to the UnBBayes documentation
(Matsumoto et al., 2011) are:
• Nodes in a Bayesian network graph
(Pearl, 1988) represent “random vari-
ables” which can contain several possible
states. To each node a probability dis-
tribution of its possible states can be
assigned. Among these possible values,
exactly one of them “[...] will be the
actual value at a given moment”.
• Edges are direct links between nodes
which express their probabilistic rela-
tionships and “[...] direct qualitative
dependencies of the random variables.”
• A Conditional Probability Table (CPT)
represents the local probability distribu-
tion which is a function “[...] specifying
the quantitative information about the
strength of the dependencies.”
Therefore, a Bayesian network is a struc-
tured, graphical representation of probabilis-
tic relationships between several random vari-
ables. In Bayesian probability, the act of in-
ference means updating beliefs as new infor-
mation becomes available. Bayes’ rule “[...]
provides a method for updating the proba-
bility of a proposition when information is
acquired about a related proposition.”
Bayes’ rule is represented by the equation
P (X|Y ) = P (Y |X)P (X)
(P (Y )
where:
• P (X|Y ): The probability of X given Y.
• P (Y |X): The probability of Y given X.
• P (X): The a priori probability of X.
• P (Y ): The a priori probability of Y.
The a priori probabilities are thereby the
independent likelihoods before any evidence
has been obtained. The reasoning systems
of our selected modeling tool rely on Bayes’
rule. The entity directory of our model is
given in Table 1 which can be found in the
Appendix because of its length. The Figures
9–13 represent an example in form of a partial
view of our risk model which should help
understanding how it works.
Based on the nature of each node, we added
different states to the corresponding node.
For example, node PBR (Potential BRoker)
has been assigned two states Yes and No.
Then, we initially generated a uniform proba-
bility distribution, which means that without
any evidence we assign each state equal pri-
ori probabilities as it can be seen in Figure 8.
That is, if we do not have any evidence for a
given node, we equally divide 1 by the num-
ber of states in order to calculate its priori
probabilities. Based on actual findings/evi-
dence provided by users, these probabilities
can be adjusted and the probabilities of sub-
sequent related nodes will be re-calculated
automatically.
The main task of our risk model is to iden-
tify a possible occurrence of organ trading
based on evidence from a surrounding area.
Basically, our risk model states that (a) an
area that had been greatly impacted by or-
gan trafficking in the past increases the risk
of organ trading occurrences, (b) the vulnera-
bility of states to collapse in a region is a risk
factor for organ trading, and (c) the history
of organ trafficking and the vulnerability of
states to collapse in a region cannot be distin-
guished by occurrence of organ trading alone
(Figures 9–13).
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Figure 7. An overview of the risk model describing factors and relations influencing the
process of organ trafficking.
Our model is able to visualize the relevant
information that should be collected to better
predict the results based on the actual situ-
ation. In addition, our model is sufficiently
flexible to allow users to add uncertain infor-
mation based on their goals.
In order to show the usage of our risk
model, we used some sample runs and their
conclusions. Figure 14 shows 20 randomly
generated cases which were artificially cre-
ated based on collected evidence. The data
was generated by running Netica by Norsys12,
a tool providing methods to work with belief
networks and influence diagrams. We used
12http://www.norsys.com/download.html
Netica to create combinations of the nodes in
different states, so called training data, dur-
ing the learning process of our model. The au-
tomatically generated outcome of this learn-
ing process is the trained risk model shown
in Figure 15.
The probabilities of nodes were changed
from those in Figure 8. According to the
facts, our model is able to provide sugges-
tions such as type of information that should
be collected by which organizations to better
predict results. For example, a person who
seeks to sell a kidney and also has posted a
kidney for sale advertisement increases the
chance of being identified as a potential vic-
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Figure 8. Risk model with a priori probabilities.
Figure 9. Partial risk model - events of seek-
ing to buy or sell a kidney.
tim of organ trafficking. If law enforcement
intends to stop such transactions, collecting
recent online ads from both dark and deep
web may be an effective method.
Figure 10. Assigning initial distributions to
the nodes.
7. CONCLUSION &
FUTURE WORK
The main contribution of this research is de-
veloping a risk model for organ trafficking
based on collecting related data both manu-
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Figure 11. A place greatly impacted by organ
trafficking.
Figure 12. A place known for its high conflict
rate.
Figure 13. An area known for its high rate of
conflict and great impact by organ trafficking.
ally and automatically. It enables users, such
as policy makers, government agencies, and
researchers to better understand the entire
organ trafficking chain and to positively affect
peoples’ decisions. Moreover, our risk model
is a probabilistic knowledge-based model that
allows using incomplete, inconsistent informa-
tion within the organ trafficking supply chain.
That is, our model is sufficiently flexible to
allow the users to add uncertain information
based on their goals. If users provided enough
effective data, our risk model can conduct reg-
ular risk assessments regarding the constant
changes of organ trafficking. Therefore, it will
be a useful tool to develop policy response
and operational interventions for such illicit
trades.
In order to automatically collect related
organ trafficking data, we provided a method-
ology and tools that can directly be used to
support the search for clandestine human
organ trade in the dark web. The current
literature consist of research on crawling the
hidden and dark web (Fu et al., 2010; Nunes
et al., 2016) and how to identify web content
related to organ trafficking (Pandey et al.,
2013). However, at the time of this writing,
to the best of our knowledge, there do not
exist dedicated, publicly available research
paper on how existing tools work and how to
use them for use-cases such as revealing ille-
gal human organ trafficking in the dark web.
Our research combines and extends such pre-
vious research efforts to support the search
for clandestine human organ trade in the dark
web. Furthermore, because there is especially
very little technical documentation about the
tools provided by the Memex project, this
work and corresponding repositories could
also be useful for developers’ own projects.
Topics for further research and develop-
ment are specific tools to systematically ex-
plore social media channels. It could also
be considered to partner with commercial
vendors of dark web exploration tools in or-
der to test their result rates for the use-case
of organ trafficking. Furthermore, data al-
ready collected by projects like the IMPACT
Cyber Trust13 or the Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity Online Anonymous Marketplace Re-
search project14 could be used to apply search
patterns of organ trafficking in order to ex-
13https://www.impactcybertrust.org/
14https://arima.cylab.cmu.edu/markets/
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Figure 14. Excerpt from 20 use-cases to train the risk model.
Figure 15. Trained risk model based on the 20 use-cases.
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tract content and also to systematically spot
platforms with high occurrences.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Descriptions of the risk model’s nodes.
Node Abbreviation Description
FSI Fragile State Index
SI Social Indicators
DP Demographic Pressures
D Disease
ND Natural Disasters
PG Population Growth
IM Infant Mortality
EH Environmental Hazards
R IDPs Refugees and Internally Discplaced Persons (IDPs)
R IDP C The Presence of Refugee and IDP Camps
R IDPs PC Refugees and IDPs per Capita
AC Absorption Capacity
RE Relief Efforts
TVR Targeted Violence and Repression
GG Group Grievance
DC Discrimination
EV Ethnic Violence
CV Communal Violence
SV Sectarian Violance
RV Religious Violence
HF BD Human Flight and Brain Drain
M PC Migration Per Capita
PEoEP Particularly Emigration of the Educated Population
ReMit ReMittances
GoE Growth of Exile
EC Expatriate Communities
EI Economic Indicators
UnE ED UnEven Economic Development
GB PEL Group-Based Poverty and Education Levels
EoS Existence of Slums
FoHHP Fairness of Housing and Hiring Practices
P ED Poverty and Economic Decline
PCI Per Capita Income
GNP Gross National Product
ED Economic Deficit
UnE UnEmployment
PL Poverty Levels
BF Business Failures
InF Inflation
PI Political Indicators
SL State Legitimacy
C PbRE Corruption or Profiteering by Ruling Elites (RE)
RtT Resistance to Transparency
LoD Level of Democracy
P DT Protests and DemonsTrations
IlE Illicit Economy
PS Public Service
ES Essential Services
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Table 1. Descriptions of the risk model’s nodes.
Node Abbreviation Description
UoSA A The Use of the State Apparatus for Agencies that serve RE
HR RoL Human Rights and Rule of Law
PF CL Press Freedom and Civil Liberties
AoL any widespread Abuse of Legal
P SR Political and Social Rights for individuals, goups, or cultural
institutions
SA Security Apparatus
IC Internal Conflict
RP Riots and Protests
MC Military Coups
RA Rebel Activity
EoPM Emergence of state-related Private Militias terrorizing opposi-
tionists
FE Factionalised Elites
EPS Elite Power Struggles
FElec Flawed Elections
UoANR Use of Aggressive Nationalistic Rhetoric
EI External Intervention
LoFA Level of Foreign Assistance
UN M presence of peacekeepers or UN Missions
FMI Foreign Military Intervention
Sanc Sanctions
CR Credit Ratings
HoOT History of Organ Trafficking
SsbK Seeking to sell or buy Kidney
SsK Seeking to sell Kidney
KL Sta Kidney, Live Status
SbK Seeking to buy Kidney
KL Sup Kidney, Liver Supply
PBR is Potential Broker
PFD has Personal Financial Difficulty
SKA has posted Sell Kidney Advertisement
BKA has posted Buy Kidney Advertisement
PS Potential kidney Seller
RM Received Money
H Hospital
TS Transplant Surgeon
PPTS Potential Participating Transplant Surgeon
PPH Potential Participating Hospital
PB Potential Buyer
PM Pay Money
PTS Participating Transplant Surgeon
BRGM BRoker Gives Money
PH Participating Hospital
S Seller
BGM Buyer Gives Money
BR Broker
B Buyer
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